It is in strategic outlook that we are likely to see a marked difference. In 2021, the UK published its much-vaunted Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, a historic state paper that set out Britain’s aspirations for its role in a post-Brexit world. One of the most important elements of the review was the so-called “Indo-Pacific tilt”.
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Reversing more than a half-century of British foreign policy – the Labour government of Harold Wilson declared in 1968 that the UK no longer considered that it had important strategic interests “east of Suez” – the review concluded that Britain’s 21st-century interests were indeed global; that the increasingly borderless nature of threats to the international order meant geography and locality were of less importance; that the geostrategic binary of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific was less relevant; and that as a global actor, which Britain aspired to be, it must adjust its strategic posture accordingly.
Labour promises broad continuity in UK foreign policy, and has not repudiated the “Indo-Pacific tilt”, but its enthusiasm for the wider global engagement that underpins the Integrated Review is muted. Many in Labour see “global Britain” as just Brexiteer rhetoric, the aspiration to be a major player beyond Europe dismissed as Johnsonian hubris. Labour’s foreign policy interests beyond the NATO area are likely to focus on the Middle East and Africa, not the Indo-Pacific.
The shadow foreign secretary, David Lammy, has already announced that a Labour government would subject the UK-China relationship to a comprehensive “cross-Whitehall” audit upon coming into office. When I spoke to West last week, she told me the terms of the audit would not be published until after the election. However, it is reasonably clear that its scope will not be limited to the China relationship; it is likely to extend to the UK’s broader engagement with the Indo-Pacific.
In politics, the announcement of an “audit” is usually code for a reassessment of priorities and a reallocation of resources. The UK defence budget is already under serious pressure. Labour wants to significantly expand development assistance.
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Wars in Ukraine and Gaza have refocused attention on Britain’s nearer interests. Public discussion in London reflects increasing alarm at Russia’s future intentions in Europe beyond Ukraine, heightened last week by an unexpected visit by Vladimir Putin to the Russian Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, which was widely interpreted as a threatening message to the Baltic democracies.
In this environment, it seems unlikely the globalist ambitions of the Integrated Review, in particular the Indo-Pacific “tilt”, will be embraced by a future Labour government. The UK will continue to engage diplomatically in our region, for instance, as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner and through the Commonwealth, but its focus will narrow as its attentions return closer to home.
George Brandis is a former high commissioner to the UK, and a former Liberal senator and federal attorney-general. He is now a professor in the practice of national security at the ANU’s National Security College.
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